The apparent victory in Indonesia’s presidential election of Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, a general who was dishonorably dismissed from the military in 1998 and blocked from entry into the U.S. and Australia over his alleged involvement in human rights abuses, is raising concerns about the future of democracy.

Many are worried that Prabowo, previously married to the daughter of the late dictator Suharto, has little commitment to democracy and will take Indonesia in an authoritarian direction.

Ian Wilson, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, argues that the path toward authoritarianism is clear given consistent calls from Prabowo and his party Gerindra to return Indonesia to its original 1945 Constitution.

Its legal foundations served as the basis for the authoritarian rule of Indonesia’s first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, as the 1945 Constitution allowed for the centralization of power in the executive with no term limits.

It also lacked protections for democratic institutions or human rights. These were only added through a series of amendments adopted between 1999 and 2002 after Suharto’s fall.

It would be misleading, however, to focus inordinately on Prabowo’s personal traits and the narrative of the 1945 Constitution.

Ten years ago, observers applying this kind of analysis celebrated Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s accession to the presidency as bringing new hope for Indonesian democracy. Yet to the contrary, the last few years of Jokowi’s presidency have seen a number of illiberal moves that have weakened the foundations of democracy in Indonesia.

By looking closely at how Indonesian democracy works, we can see that there are structural constraints that stand in the way of reestablishing authoritarian rule. Not from civil society, but rather from competition among contending predatory elites seeking to concentrate power and wealth in their own hands.

As a result, democracy will not die in Indonesia simply as the result of Prabowo’s apparent victory. It will run just as usual, maintaining the legacy of Jokowi’s administration. Ruling elites will continue to undermine democracy but without going so far as to replace it with authoritarian rule.

It should be noted that the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 not only brought about democratization but also a decentralization of patronage relationships to different political actors, mostly linked to old networks.

As such, competition over control of, and access to, public institutions among these actors has since been unavoidable, particularly around election time. As these elites share an interest in amassing power and wealth for their networks, they frequently come together in loose alliances of convenience.

A prime example is the alignment of Prabowo and Gerindra with Jokowi following Prabowo’s bitter losses to Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. Joining Jokowi’s cabinet as defense minister gave the former general a platform to reconnect with the military and with key foreign governments like those of Australia and the U.S.

Competitive elections in Indonesia in effect serve as a medium to negotiate the sharing of political and economic resources.

Under an authoritarian regime, power and resources are concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of a single ruler or party. In Indonesia, other contending elites realize such concentration would likely not be in their interest and thus seek to hinder moves in this direction.

This dynamic could be seen in the failure of moves to extend Jokowi’s stay in office by delaying the next election or formally extending his term.

Several people close to the presidential palace talked up the idea of prolonging Jokowi’s term, a step that would have required a constitutional amendment. Objections from democracy advocates were easily disregarded but the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Jokowi’s own party and the largest in parliament, acted to block any legislative movement on the idea.

Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno’s daughter and a former president herself, led the resistance as head of the PDI-P. Recounting the episode on a television talk show earlier this month, she said she and her party simply had a duty to guard the constitution.

“If not us, who else?” she said. “Our country would be in disorder without the Constitution.”

Notwithstanding her high-minded rhetoric, Megawati’s real motive was an interest in furthering her family dynasty by paving the way for her own daughter, House of Representatives Speaker Puan Maharani, to run for president in 2024.

But amid low public support for Puan’s candidacy, Megawati ultimately allowed Ganjar Pranowo, former governor of Central Java, to instead carry the PDI-P’s banner in last week’s election due to his higher relative popularity.

Megawati’s resistance to amending the constitution, meanwhile, opened a rift with Jokowi. This was reflected in the president throwing his support in last week’s election to Prabowo rather than to Ganjar, his own party’s nominee.

The PDI-P looks set to again be the largest party in the next legislature, while Gerindra appears to have finished third in parliamentary voting with around 13% of the vote, according to unofficial counts.

Gerindra’s weak presence will limit Prabowo’s ability to centralize power. To secure his legislative agenda and ensure a stable government, Prabowo will likely seek to build a coalition that constitutes a parliamentary majority.

This will require negotiations to share government power and resources with parties that were already in his electoral coalition, including Golkar and the Democratic Party, and parties that were not, as well as with Jokowi himself.

With the inauguration of the next president not due until October, Jokowi retains substantial power so Prabowo will seek to avoid rifts and indeed will likely continue to pledge to carry on Jokowi’s policies.

The constant competition for power and negotiations among contending anti-democratic elites are, though, exactly what stands in the way of Indonesia’s descending back into authoritarian rule.

Yet at the same time, the foundations of Indonesian democracy will probably continue to be undermined. During the remainder of Jokowi’s term and under Prabowo, officials will likely seek to manipulate laws and regulations to tame political foes, silence critics and even plunder material resources.

Civil society is too weak to significantly challenge anti-democratic interests on its own. But with better organization, civil society could become a real force for protecting democracy from hijack by predatory elites. Indonesian democracy could certainly use the help.

Article by Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir

Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir is the Asian studies subject coordinator at the Asia Institute of the University of Melbourne and the author of “State of Disorder: Privatised Violence and the State in Indonesia.”

This article published in Nikkei
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Prabowo-s-victory-won-t-bring-authoritarian-rule-back-in-Indonesia